politics

Germany, Romania and the July Crisis (1914)


Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 263-278
No. of Pages: 16
Keywords: , , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: Of all the European powers involved in the conduct of the Great War, Germany suffered the most as a result of the responsibilities it had. In Berlin, the crisis in July 1914 revealed the behaviour of a small group of decision-takers in government. The Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm had no overview of the development of the war, no military and civilian strategy. No state council validated rationally the critical situation for which, later, the nation was held responsible. The political elite, mainly of aristocratic origin, was indecisive. They were beset by doubts, confusion and petty quarrels. Discussions in late July and early August limited the short-term management of the political crisis. The way this crisis would affect the nation’s future was not discussed. Berlin resembled a house without an owner. Balkan politics replaced its aspirations for world domination. Unlike Germany, Romania did not react to the crisis in July with the arguments of a great power. In Romania, the Crown Council, convened in Sinaia on July 21, 1914, decided everything. In modern Romania, few foreign policy debates have played a role as important. At the end of the debate, King Carol I, as a constitutional monarch, had to accept neutrality. He considered that Romania would regret this decision in the future. After July 21, Romania’s policy towards Germany changed significantly. After the adoption of neutrality, Romania was de facto outside any contractual obligations. The real heart of the negotiations moved towards the attractions of co-belligerence. For the first time in their recent history, mistrust, lack of hope for the future and instability now characterized Romanian-German relations.
Open access on CEEOL: NO



Share this article
Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail

The Culture of War. From the Sources of War to the Concept of War


Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 6-24
No. of Pages: 19
Keywords: , , , , , , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: The incentive for this paper is the lack of a clear distinction between war and crime. This implies that a profound theoretically defined concept of war is necessary in order for war to be definitely differed from crime. The author maintains that the culture of war is necessary way to separate the war from crime. In order to associate culture to war, one is supposed to find out a denominator which they share in common. The common denominator of culture and politics (security, war etc.) is land/territory/soil. An etymological analysis is provided in order to support the premise. Culture etymologically means the cultivation of land. Politics, originally meaning the ‘wall’, is the fencing and distribution of land, and therefore the struggle for land. This implies that politics (including war) is just a special form of culture. The war is to be cultivated in order to prevent its deviation into a crime. Paper provides the historical account of culture of land distribution. The account includes the cases of ancient Greece’s deme, ancient Rome’s ager publicus, Byzantine’s pronia system, Ottomans’ timar system, etc. The author starts his analysis of the war with the sources of war: conflict relationship, aggressiveness and security. The culture of war asserts to begin from the sources of war. This view finds strong support in Aristotle’s concept of the virtue of courage which is defined by fear. The novelty of this paper is the author’s concept of the culture of fear which is to replace currently ruling culture of unlimited courage as the cause of crime. The culture of fear is the most appropriate device thwarting the deviation of war into a crime. Article concludes with the concept of war, also relied on Aristotle’s view, which is defined by its purpose – peace.
Open access on CEEOL: NOT YET



Share this article
Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail