Issue No. 22 (2014)


Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 6-24
No. of Pages: 19
Keywords: , , , , , , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: The incentive for this paper is the lack of a clear distinction between war and crime. This implies that a profound theoretically defined concept of war is necessary in order for war to be definitely differed from crime. The author maintains that the culture of war is necessary way to separate the war from crime. In order to associate culture to war, one is supposed to find out a denominator which they share in common. The common denominator of culture and politics (security, war etc.) is land/territory/soil. An etymological analysis is provided in order to support the premise. Culture etymologically means the cultivation of land. Politics, originally meaning the ‘wall’, is the fencing and distribution of land, and therefore the struggle for land. This implies that politics (including war) is just a special form of culture. The war is to be cultivated in order to prevent its deviation into a crime. Paper provides the historical account of culture of land distribution. The account includes the cases of ancient Greece’s deme, ancient Rome’s ager publicus, Byzantine’s pronia system, Ottomans’ timar system, etc. The author starts his analysis of the war with the sources of war: conflict relationship, aggressiveness and security. The culture of war asserts to begin from the sources of war. This view finds strong support in Aristotle’s concept of the virtue of courage which is defined by fear. The novelty of this paper is the author’s concept of the culture of fear which is to replace currently ruling culture of unlimited courage as the cause of crime. The culture of fear is the most appropriate device thwarting the deviation of war into a crime. Article concludes with the concept of war, also relied on Aristotle’s view, which is defined by its purpose – peace.
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Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 25-47
No. of Pages: 23
Keywords: , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: Public workers, writers, scientists, artists, politicians, economists, the press and diplomats involved themselves in popularizing their country by spreading information and essential reviews in information offices, media centers and foreign embassies. In the interval from the recognition of the independence of Latvia de facto until its international recognition de iure (1918–1921), issues regarding the proposals made by Zigfrīds Anna Meirovics for the concept of mutual cooperation between the Baltic States became urgent. Therefore the Conference of Baltic States, which took place from August 6 to September 6, 1920, in Jūrmala, was particularly important. In 1925, the Government of France invited Latvia to participate in the International Decorative and Industrial Arts Exhibition. It was right the Paris exhibition where several artists won their first international acclaim. The first national representation of Latvia, a comprehensive art exhibition, took place only in Stockholm in 1927, in the Swedish Artists House. The preparatory work in Latvia for the exhibition was supervised by Vilhelms Purvītis. In the same year 1927, the Riga City Art Museum held Swedish several art exhibitions. The presentation of art work also marked the ongoing development of Swedish – Latvian cooperation, which culminated in the highest level exchange visits of both countries. In 1932, as a result of diplomatic relationships the Latvian State Museum of Art received a donation – a collection of works by Belgian artists, altogether 51 works. Later, in 1935, this was supplemented by a donation of a collection of medals. In Western European countries the ‘marathon’ started with the exhibition in the Oslo Artists’ House in 1933. An exhibition of Latvian art was presented in Warsaw and Krakow, as well as in Helsinki in 1936. In 1937, on an intergovernmental level, exhibitions of Latvian art were displayed in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest; in 1938 – in Copenhagen. Latvia took part in the world art exhibition in Brussels in 1935 with 39 works by 21 artists. Latvian modern art was recognized by critics of that time as the greatest success of the whole international exhibition. ‘Flowers’ by Leo Svemps was acquired by the Brussels Royal Art Museum. The Baltic States organized a joint folk art and ethnographic exposition in the Trokadero Palace in France in 1935. A World Art and Technology Exhibition took place in Paris in 1937. The Jeu de Paume Museum in Paris displayed paintings, sculptures and works of applied arts of Latvian artists from January 27 to March 5, 1939. The exhibition provided an opportunity to get acquainted with Latvian grand masters Vilhelms Purvītis and Jānis Rozentāls, and the new painters who had turned to French art of that time – Jēkabs Kazaks, Jāzeps Grosvalds, Oto Skulme, Uga Skulme, Niklāvs Strunke, Ģederts Eliass, Leo Svempe, etc. Latvian art had gained new, internationally recognized quality in exhibitions abroad in the 1930s. In the dialogue between art and diplomacy Vilhelms Purvītis, the head commissioner of exhibitions and Erasts Šveics, the commissioner, as well as the representatives of the Embassies – diplomats Oļģerds Grosvalds, Kārlis Zariņš, Alfreds Bīlmanis, etc., played an exceptionally important part together with countless helpers in the preparation of the events. World War II and the years of Soviet occupation was a time that severed the recognition of Latvian art in Western Europe. Latvian culture was incorporated into a different ideological channel, and in international cooperation it became dependent on decisions made in Moscow.
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Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 48-57
No. of Pages: 10
Keywords: , , ,
Summary/Abstract: This paper aims to present the way the Hebrew people were perceived by the Romanian society of the nineteenth century, especially by those from Iasi, whose perception was deeply influenced by the political group mentioned above. We will try to insist in this study on three main coordinates: the manner in which the Hebrew people were seen at the time, the anti-Semitic ideology of the “factionists”, and not the least, on the way in which the “factionists” discourse produced mutations in the social representation of the Romanian Jew. The study is based mainly on the analysis of the “factional” press of the time, this being the main environment in which they propagated anti-Semitic ideas. We also analyzed letters, memoirs and unpublished archival documents that have helped us to achieve a better understanding of the impact which the “factional” concepts had over the entire Romanian society.
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Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 58-73
No. of Pages: 16
Keywords: , , , , , , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: Throughout the entirety of military operations carried out during the Second World War, the Battle of Berlin (April 16 – May 2, 1945) provided a special meaning for all combatants: for the United Nations (Western Allies and the Soviet Union) it was the ultimate price for a costly and, until then, highly desired victory, while for the German Reich, it marked the end of an illusion. Furthermore, the conquest of Berlin, despite the inter-ally agreements regarding the postwar management of the German territory, could influence a behavioral review from one or several of the Allies. The capture of a bridge across the Rhine, in Remagen, on March 7, 1945, by the soldiers of the 9th American Tank Division, caused a poignant response within the Soviet General Headquarters (STAVKA) and amplified the concerns of generalissimo Stalin regarding the honesty of Western Allies. The manner in which the Red Army decided to take Berlin, as well as its temporary abandonment by the Western Allies, represents one of the most distressing episodes of inter-allied history and, furthermore, it would alter the evolution of relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union in the perspective of what was to be the Cold War.
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Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 74-96
No. of Pages: 23
Keywords: , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: After the crisis from Czechoslovakia (August 1968), the Romanian authorities had never publicly pronounced in favour of Romania’s leaving the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Nicolae Ceauşescu and the generals of the Romanian Army considered the military preparations taking place within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation had to go on, but they made an attempt to impose certain limits, among which the most important referred to the regulation, based on normative documents of international character and to common interest, of certain issues pertaining to the transit and cross-country of the national territory by troops of the allied states, as well as the regulation concerning the participation of national armies to military applications in other countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation by signing bi-lateral and multilateral conventions. The signing of the Final Act in Helsinki couldn’t determine a limit to arming within Europe. The authorities from Moscow ordered the installing of SS-20 nuclear missiles in GDR and Czechoslovakia and tried to introduce new superior types of conventional armament within WTO’s armies. After a period of time, Nicolae Ceausescu took a disputed decision and he announced Leonid Brezhnev that Romania could not agree with the Soviet military plans for replacing the old conventional arsenal with a new one (Moscow, November 1978). That decision was very important for the Romanian economy but for WTO’s powerful was a bad idea. After the earthquake (March 4, 1977), the Romanian economy was much weakened and Nicolae Ceausescu didn’t have financial resources for rebuilding and developing the Romanian economy but besides that he wanted to realise important infrastructure objectives without the economic and know-how assistance from abroad (e.g. ’Danube – Black Sea’ and ’Bucharest – Danube’ Channels). Furthermore, Nicolae Ceausescu opposed to Moscow’s military proposals though he endangered the strategic goals of the military and political alliance to which Romania had already been involved.
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Language: English
Subject(s): History
Page Range: 97-117
No. of Pages: 21
Keywords: , , , , ,
Summary/Abstract: Most of the Eurobarometers since before the European Union enlargement from 2004 and 2007 indicated increased values of trust in the European institutions from the citizens of the 12 countries that prepared themselves for the admission at that time. The transition from the communist regimes to democracy proved to be a difficult process in many of the Eastern Europe countries, a process that not only put pressure on those countries’ social and economic reforms, but also changed the perception of their citizens towards the European institutions and politics. Romania is one of the Eastern European countries where the “attraction” for all that is “European” was, for years, an intense attitude. Romanians were, before the admission in the EU, very confident in the European project and had, most of them, a positive attitude towards their country’s integration in the EU. One of the reasons that were used most frequently was the hope that the EU institutions would succeed in implementing the politics and the reforms that the national institutions failed to, in order to gain the so much desired statute of stable and consolidated democracy. A few years after the admission in the “European family”, Romanians display an increased trust in the European values and principles, but most of all, in the European institutions. Our paper will try to analyze the possible grounds for this trust and interest in – to use a general term – “Europe”, by relating to two types of variables: on the one hand, the impact of the European institutions in the Romanian society and the citizens’ perceptions about it and, on the other hand, the instability of the Romanian political and economic system.
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Language: English
Subject(s): Review
Page Range: 120-121
No. of Pages: 2
Keywords:
Summary/Abstract:
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Language: English
Subject(s): Review
Page Range: 122-123
No. of Pages: 2
Keywords:
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Language: English
Subject(s): Review
Page Range: 124-125
No. of Pages: 2
Keywords:
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